S-shaped incentive schemes and pay caps are fairly common in practice. This paper demonstrates the optimality of s-shaped incentive schemes and pay caps by incorporating salespeople's aversion to pay inequity into the standard agency model. Our analysis shows that salespeople's desire for pay fairness increases the convexity of the optimal incentive scheme at small sales but increases the concavity at large sales. Consequently, the optimal compensation plan is s-shaped. With aversion to pay inequity, the optimal incentive scheme always contains an upper bound for total payment. For practical implementation, we propose a capped quota plan to approximate the optimal s-shaped scheme. Our numerical analysis indicates that the capped quota plan has an average non-optimality of less than 2% in parametric spaces studied. The numerical analysis also explores the sources of non-optimality and the relationship between market characteristics and the optimal size of pay caps.
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Introduction
S-shaped sales incentive schemes are common in practice. A typical s-shaped incentive scheme contains varying commission rates. For example, a sales incentive scheme may include a salary of $20,000, no commission for the first $1 million sales, a commission rate of 5% for additional sales after the $1 million mark, and then a lower commission rate of 1% for any sales above $2 million (See solid line ABCD in Figure 1 for an illustration).
1 The $1 million mark is often interpreted as a sales quota. A special case of the s-shaped incentive schemes is a pay cap, which imposes a maximum amount of total sales commissions to be earned by a salesperson. As illustrated in Figure 1 , an incentive scheme can contain a commission cap of $50,000 (See line ABCE in Figure 1 ). On reaching the pay cap, sales commission rate effectively becomes zero. Alternatively one could interpret this as a cap of $70,000 for the total pay.
According to 2005 Hewitt Sales Compensation Survey, 43% of the companies used pay caps for salespeople and 47% used pay caps for sales managers. More recently, 2009 Incentive Practice Studies by ZS Associates shows that s-shaped sales incentive schemes were used in 65% to 85% of sales teams in pharmaceutical industry, with s-shaped commission rates more common than pay caps. 2 Some bonus contracts can also be interpreted as s-shaped incentive schemes. For example, an incentive scheme may include a bonus of $10,000 for reaching $1 million sales, an extra bonus of $20,000 for reaching the $2 million sales target, but no additional bonus for reaching any new milestones. Such patterns were frequently observed in sales contracts illustrated in Oyer (2000) .
Although s-shaped incentive schemes are commonly observed, to the best of our knowledge, previous research has not investigated the underlying reasons for such incentive schemes. This paper is intended to bridge this gap by developing a theory built on the premise that sales agents are concerned about pay fairness. Fairness is an important issue in sales management because the perceived pay fairness can affect salespeople's job satisfaction (Smith 2010) , which, in turn, may affect performance and loyalty 2 (Ramaswami and Singh 2003, Card et al. 2010) . This is particularly important in industries where a salesperson's relationship with their clients is critical in maintaining account stability.
Figure 1: S-shaped Sales Incentive Schemes
Our model focuses on fairness associated with pay equity between different salespeople, i.e. the "intra-firm compensation inequity" defined in Joseph and Kalwani (1998) . Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Cui, Raju, and Zhang (2007) , and Ho and Su (2009) , we include the disutility for unfairness, more specifically, the aversion to pay inequity compared to peer salespeople, as an additive term in the salespeople's utility functions. Unlike the conventional approach typified by Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, and Staelin (1985) (here after referred to as BLSS) that considers each individual salesperson separately, this paper studies a group of salespeople simultaneously in order to account for fairness concerns. Our analysis suggests that aversion to pay inequity increases the convexity of optimal incentive schemes for small values of sales outcomes. When sales volume is low, a salesperson is most likely to experience disutility resulting from pay inequity. As the aversion to pay inequity creates extra incentive for the salesperson, the firm provides less monetary incentives through sales commissions. In contrast, when sales volume is large, fairness concern increases the concavity of the optimal incentive schemes because the firm wants to contain the expected pay inequity across salespeople. accounting for fairness concerns leads to an s-shaped optimal incentive scheme. We also demonstrate that it is indeed optimal for the firm to place an upper bound on the total commission it pays to the salespeople.
In their seminal paper, BLSS identify three different shapes of optimal compensation schemes: concave, convex, or linear corresponding to salesperson's risk tolerance being lower than one, higher than one, or equal to one. In their results, the commission rates always change monotonically as the sales increase and thus the s-shaped compensation schemes cannot be optimal in a BLSS context in spite of a very versatile specification of utility and sales response functions. Raju and Srinivasan (1996) (here after referred to as RS) study the optimal design of quota-based compensation schemes for a sales force with different territory potentials. RS focus on the convex case of BLSS's optimal schemes and demonstrate the near optimality of quota plans. In other studies related to sales force compensation, a simple linear commission structure is often used. Such examples include the compensation schemes incorporating customer satisfaction (Hauser, Simester, and Wernefelt 1994; Kalra, Shi, and Srinivasan 2003) , compensation schemes for independent sales agents (Caldieraro and Coughlan 2009) , monitoring (Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998) , multi-product (Lal and Srinivasan 1993) , information asymmetry (Lal and Staelin 1986) , and delegation (e.g., Bhardwaj 2001; Dong, Yao and Cui 2011) . Simple linear commission structures are also common in lab-based empirical studies (e.g., Ghosh and John 2000) .
Our paper contributes to the emerging literature on fairness and its impact on firms' management strategies. Srinivasan (1981) shows that an equal commission rate policy can be optimal when a salesperson seeks a "fair-income" and chooses his effort to match the equitable earning. However, Srinivasan (1981) does not incorporate the fairness concern explicitly into agents' utility function to study how such concerns could affect the optimal sales commission structure. Fehr, Alexander and Schmidt (2007) show experimentally that when some agents are fair-minded, bonus contracts provide better incentives than contracts with upfront wage payment. In an experimental study, Güth et al. (2001) consider heterogeneous agents who care about fairness both between the principal and themselves, and among the agents. They assume that agents' productivities are deterministic but unequal, and thus the 4 principal can infer their effort from output. The authors show that in such cases, a principal will offer less asymmetric compensation plans to the heterogeneous agents when agents know each other's compensation plans, than when they do not have such information. Our study considers homogeneous agents with stochastic sales production functions such that the agents' efforts cannot be completely inferred from their outputs. The model by Desiraju and Sappington (2007) is most closely related to our paper. Desiraju and Sappington (2007) incorporate concerns of inequity into an adverse selection model and show that agents' aversion to ex-post inequity is not constraining for the principal if the agents are identical ex ante. Our analysis however suggests that salespeople's concerns for fairness will affect the compensation plans offered by the principal even when salespeople are identical ex-ante. Finally, Lim (2010) shows that when contestants care about outcomes relative to other contestants, a contest should have a higher proportion of winners.
Our research also adds to the growing literature on incorporating behavioral theories into quantitative models to better understand how these affect firms' strategic marketing decisions (e.g., Amaldoss and Jain 2005; Bradlow, Hu and Ho 2004a, 2004b; Chen and Cui 2010; Chen, Iyer and Pazgal 2010; Cui, Raju and Zhang 2007; Feinberg, Krishna and Zhang 2002; Hardie, Johnson and Fader 1993; Ho, Lim, and Camerer 2006; Ho and Zhang 2008; Kalra and Shi 2010; Lim, Ahearne and Ham 2009; Orhun 2009; Syam, Krishnamurthy and Hess 2008; etc.) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline an agency model that incorporates fairness concerns. We provide the main analytical results on optimal compensation schemes in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the algorithm and the results of numerical studies on quota plans with pay caps. Finally, we conclude with main findings from our analysis and directions for future research.
Model
Consider a firm that employs N identical salespeople (i,e., with the same sales productivity). Each of these N salespeople is matched with one independent territory. We use the same index i for salespeople 5 and territories, where i=1, 2,…N. Sales outcome in a territory depends on the selling efforts of the salesperson assigned to the territory, but is independent of the efforts of other salespeople. We denote sales in territory i by x i , and salesperson i's effort by t i . From the firm's perspective, all N territories are the same ex ante. Specifically, sales in all territories follow the same cumulative distribution F(x i | t i ), where i=1, 2, …N. Following the standard principal-agent models, we assume the firm (or sales manager) cannot observe a salesperson's effort. Since sales outcomes are stochastic, the firm cannot perfectly infer a salesperson's effort from the salesperson's sales outcome either. We let s i denote the compensation plan for salesperson i. Since sales are the only observable outcome, and territories are independent, we consider a sales-based compensation function s i =s i (x i ). We assume that s i (x i ) > 0; that is, a salesperson's compensation increases with his sales volume. This assumption implies that sales volume and compensation follow the same rank order. More specifically, the probability of a salesperson's pay being the highest within a group is the same as that of his sales being the highest. Finally, we assume that s i is always positive; in other words, we only admit those compensation plans not involving any possibility of monetary loss for salespeople.
Salesperson's Decision
Each salesperson (i) decides the selling effort (t i ) to maximize his expected value computed over the distributions of all N salespeople's sales, x=(x 1 , x 2 , …, x N ), as follows:
As indicated in Equation (1), salesperson i's utility depends on income and pay fairness. More specifically, U(s i ) is salesperson i's utility of his compensation pay s i and  is the coefficient of disutility from pay inequity. We follow the standard assumption that utility function U is monotonically increasing but the marginal utility U(s) is monotonically decreasing with compensation s. We further assume a salesperson's disutility from pay inequity is separable from the utility from pay, and is a linear function of the pay inequity scaled by a fairness parameter . These assumptions are commonly used in the literature 6 on fairness (Charness and Rabin 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Ho and Su 2009 Employees' concerns for pay inequity are well documented in the literature. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) review a list of alternative reasons for why employees may dislike pay inequity; ranging from selfesteem, reciprocity, to jealousy. Our model in Equation (1) assumes that, when evaluating pay inequity, a salesperson compares his pay with the highest pay in the group. We assume that ex-post each salesperson will know the sales and pay achieved by the top performer within the reference group. Most organizations have a policy of secrecy with regard to wages and salaries. However, virtually all the sales forces follow the practice of recognizing top performers and in the process disclose how well they performed, and often publicize their compensation. Contests are often organized at both company and division levels. Ex ante, however, when making decisions on their selling efforts, salespeople form expectations about the anticipated pay inequity based on their beliefs on sales outcomes. Existing research indicates that perceived fairness of pay is determined by an individual's comparison of his pay to others in the reference group, and the typical reference group includes others with similar skills (Carroll and Tosi 1977, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 2000) . In our model, we consider N salespeople with identical skills and territories, and hence identical sales effectiveness. Within the reference group of N sales representatives, we assume that a salesperson considers the highest pay in the group as the reference point. This is consistent with results in Martin (1981) . When technicians in a factory were asked whether they liked to know the highest, average, or lowest pay of technicians for comparison to their own wage, interestingly, most of them wanted to know the highest pay among all technicians.
Since our model focuses on fairness associated with pay inequity between different salespeople within the same firm, the fairness falls in the domain of "intra-firm compensation inequity" defined in Joseph and Kalwani (1998) and "peer-induced fairness" defined in Ho and Su (2009) . In our model, ex-7 ante all the salespeople are identical in their abilities and territories are similar to one another (and efforts in the equilibrium); however, ex-post they may generate different amount of sales, and therefore be compensated differently, resulting in different effort-reward ratios. However, unlike in a sales contest where one salesperson's pay depends on other salespeople's performances (Kalra and Shi 2001 ), in our model other salespeople's performances may affect the focal salesperson only through the disutility for pay inequity, but not pay.
Firm's Decision
The firm decides compensation scheme S(x) = (s 1 (x 1 ), s 2 (x 2 ), … s j (x j ), … s N (x N )) to maximize its expected profits from all N salespeople. We formulate the firm's problem as follows:
In Equation (2), the firm's profit contribution from salesperson i is equal to profit from sales  i x minus compensation s i (x i ), where  is the firm's profit margin. Equation (3) is the participation constraint (or individual rationality condition) for each of the N salespeople. Specifically, in Equation (3), each salesperson's net surplus -utility minus cost of effort should be at least as large as an outside amount.
Note that
is a function of effort, and thus models pay-effort equity as discussed in Ramaswami and Singh (2003) , and similar in spirit to the equitable pay in Srinivasan (1981) .
Analysis
Since a salesperson's perceived pay inequity is relative to what others get, we need to analyze contracts for all N salespeople simultaneously. In the equilibrium analysis, we focus on a focal salesperson i, 8 assuming the remaining (N-1) salespeople are under equilibrium contracts; that is, s j (x j ) = s * (x j ), which is identical for all ji. As a result, all these (N-1) salespeople expend t j * = t * amount of effort as suggested by IC conditions (4).
Before conducting the formal analysis on optimal compensation schemes, it is useful to understand how a marginal increase in compensation to the focal salesperson (i) would affect the pay inequity experienced by the focal salesperson (i) and another non-focal salesperson (k). We discuss this marginal effect in Section 3.1.
Marginal Effect of Sales on Pay Inequity
From salesperson i's perspective, since the remaining (N-1) salespeople all expend equilibrium effort t 
In Equation (5), we separate the expected pay inequity to salesperson k into two parts: when salesperson i has the highest sales in the group, the first part, s i -s k , is the pay inequity to salesperson k; otherwise, the second part,
, is the pay inequity to salesperson k. In Equation (5), given salesperson i's sales
If we substitute k with i, we obtain salesperson i's expected pay inequity as follows:
Now we can discuss the marginal effect on expected pay inequity due to a small increase in
, salesperson i achieves the highest sales in the group and does not experience pay inequity, but the remaining (N-1) salespeople experience pay inequity. In this case, an increase in s i (x i ) will further increase the pay inequity experienced by those (N-1) salespeople but will not change salesperson i's own pay inequity. Second, with probability 1-
, salesperson i does not achieve top sales and hence experiences pay inequity, which can be The above analysis yields two useful implications. First, at a very low level of sales x i , salesperson i is most likely to experience pay inequity. As a result, the salesperson will have an extra incentive to work harder because the incremental sales can not only increase compensation but also reduce pay inequity.
Consequently, a smaller commission rate will be sufficient to induce a desired level of effort. Second, at a very high level of sales x i , salesperson i is most likely to be the top sales agent and unlikely to experience pay inequity. In this case, any extra effort and incremental sales will be detrimental because of the increased pay inequity experienced by the remaining (N-1) salespeople. Consequently, a firm may want to lower the commission rate to contain the effort.
Optimal Compensation Schemes
We now analyze the optimal compensation schemes defined by the optimization problem in Equations (2), (3), and (4). To characterize the solution, we follow the Lagrangean approach adopted in BLSS.
where 's and 's are Lagrangean multipliers. Since we conduct marginal analysis with a focal salesperson i, it is useful to write the above Lagrangean into following explicit form. where pay inequity is given by Equation (5). In a symmetric equilibrium, optimal compensation at sales x i should satisfy following necessary condition:
Taking advantage of the symmetry, the above condition can be written as
Following the analysis in BLSS, we can rewrite the above condition into
When β = 0, Equation (7) is reduced to the familiar form in BLSS. In order to derive more explicit solutions, specific assumptions are required on salespeople's utility functions and the distributions for sales functions. Following BLSS, to begin with, we study three utility specifications with different rate of change of risk tolerance; more specifically, we consider a power function ( , 0<  <1) which has the rate of change of risk tolerance equal to 1/(1 -δ) and larger than 1, a log function (log(s)) which has the rate of change of risk tolerance equal to 1, and an exponential utility function (a -) which has the constant risk aversion and hence the rate of change of risk tolerance is equal to 0.
Second, following BLSS, we study sales response functions with f t /f = ax-b (a>0 and b>0). Such distributions include Gamma, Binomial, and Normal distributions commonly assumed in the literature.
For example, in Gamma distribution, the sales (x) conditional on effort level t i is characterized by the probability distribution function
, where the mean sales is equal
and variance is equal to
Substituting utility functions and Gamma sales response functions into Equation (7), we can derive the optimal compensation plan s * . We use the subscript p, l, and e to denote power function, log function, and exponential function.
Case 2. Log utility function (log(s)):
Case 3. Exponential utility function with constant risk aversion (a -):
When β = 0, the optimal compensation scheme s * (x i ) as shown in Equations (8), (9), and (10) is reduced to the corresponding BLSS solution. The optimal compensation functions in (8), (9), and (10) are reduced to convex, linear, and concave functions of sales x i , respectively. Following BLSS, we refer to A as the salary parameter and B as the commission rate parameter. Since s * (x i ) is not a linear function, the actual salary and commission rates will be nonlinear functions of A and B. Depending on utility specifications, from Equations (8), (9), and (10) we can derive the corresponding optimal amount of salary at
, and
Since the value of A depends on parameters β and , we cannot directly infer from this result how the salary may vary with the parameters.
Next we study the properties of optimal compensation scheme in Equations (8), (9), and (10). We summarize the properties in three lemmas leading to the first proposition. 
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Proof: See Appendix 1 for detailed proof. 4 Lemma 1 confirms that the salary parameter A is positive with an upper limit of 1/(Nβ), and commission rate parameter B is positive. Note that Lemma 1 holds for all three types of utility functions studied. Since we are primarily interested in the shape of the compensation scheme, we next examine how the slope of the compensation scheme s * (x i ) changes as x i increases. This is summarized in the following lemmas. Lemma 2 indicates the optimality of imposing an upper limit on sales compensation. As sales increase, the optimal compensation s * (x i ) also increases. However, when the sales volume is sufficiently large, the marginal compensation increase converges to zero. If we approximate the general compensation function by a piecewise linear function (BLSS, page 277), Lemma 2 suggests that the commission rate will eventually converge to zero. This effectively creates an upper limit on the total sales compensation. The presence of an upper limit also implies a concave compensation function when the sales are sufficiently large.
Lemma 2 provides the explicit expression for the optimal upper limit on the sales compensation, and shows that the upper limit depends on three parameters: β, , and N. More specifically, the upper limit is more stringent (i.e., a smaller maximum pay) when the fairness parameter β is large, a larger reference group N, and/or a smaller utility parameter . First, when salespeople are more concerned about pay fairness, the upper limit on compensation should be lower. This is because a low upper limit can reduce the expected pay inequity and increase the anticipated pay fairness. The magnitude of the fairness 14 parameter β may depend on the visibility of sales comparisons. Salespeople can become more concerned with fairness when other salespeople's performances are more visible. Such visibility can be naturally higher in the industries with fewer clients. Visibility can also be facilitated by certain company practices.
For example, announcements made by the companies to recognize their top salespeople, comparisons sales managers use to create competition among the salespeople in contests ).
Second, when salespeople face a larger reference group, the optimal compensation scheme should have a lower upper limit. This is because the unexpectedly large compensation for one salesperson can cause pay inequity for the remaining N-1 salespeople. A larger N implies a greater aggregate pay inequity and feelings of unfairness. Thus, a lower upper limit is more beneficial in restricting expected pay inequity among a larger group of salespeople. In practice, N may depend on how the salespeople are organized and how they form the reference groups. For example, if all salespeople within the same district are seen as one reference group, then a larger district has a bigger N. Alternatively, if only the salespeople within the same cohort of recruits are considered in the reference group, then N should depend on the number of new recruits and the turnover rate. Finally, a larger  indicates higher marginal utility for compensation and a higher risk tolerance. If salespeople are more motivated by the additional pay, a higher upper limit can induce more selling efforts and revenues. Thus, a larger  shifts more attention to sales and less attention to the fairness concern. As a result, the upper limit can be higher. Lemma 3 indicates that salespeople's fairness concern increases the convexity of the optimal compensation scheme s * (x i ) at low levels of sales. Recall that in the absence of fairness concerns, as in BLSS, the optimal compensation scheme is linear when salespeople exhibit a log utility function.
Interestingly, the linear turns to convex at small sales x i when β > 0. The intuition for this result is explained earlier in the marginal analysis. When the sales are low, a salesperson is more likely to suffer pay inequity. This creates additional incentive for the salesperson to work harder to reduce the expected pay inequity. As a result, the firm can provide less monetary incentive through sales commission at small 15 sales. Since the incentive to reduce pay inequity is stronger at smaller sales x, the required commission rate should increase with sales level. Thus, fairness concern turns an otherwise linear compensation curve into a convex shape at small level of sales. When fairness concern is sufficiently strong so that 2A>1, even an otherwise concave compensation scheme (under exponential utility function) can become convex.
Overall, for smaller sales outcomes, Lemma 3 shows that salespeople's aversions to pay inequity have a positive effect on their incentive to work harder.
Next we combine the results from lemmas 1-3 and summarize our main theoretical results in Proposition 1. Proposition 1 indicates that, when salespeople are sufficiently averse to pay inequity, the optimal compensation scheme should be a convex function of sales for small x i and a concave function of sales for large x i . Thus, Proposition 1 provides one possible explanation for why we commonly observe companies using s-shaped compensation schemes. Proposition 1 also indicates an upper limit for the compensation schemes. As discussed earlier, the optimal upper limit should be lower with larger values of β and N.
Next we compare our result with BLSS to show how the concern for pay fairness will alter the structure of the optimal compensation scheme. The results can be best explained with the case of log 16 utility function illustrated in Figure 2 . In this case, BLSS would recommend a linear compensation function which is equivalent to a salary and a constant commission rate, as depicted by the thin solid line.
With fairness concern ( > 0), the optimal compensation scheme becomes the s-shaped; the thick solid line in Figure 2 . There are three noticeable changes: from linear to convexity for smaller values of sales, from linear to concavity for larger values of sales, and a steeper curve at the intermediate range of sales.
First, at small sales, a salesperson is most likely to suffer from experiencing pay inequity. The aversion to anticipated pay inequity creates an additional incentive for the salesperson to work hard. As a result, a less commission-induced incentive is needed at lower sales. Second, at large sales, a salesperson is very likely to be the top salesperson. Any extra sales will increase the pay inequity experienced by the remaining (N-1) salespeople. Since such disutility is costly to the firm, it is optimal for the firm to minimize the commission rate at large sales. Third, given the lower sales commission rates at both small and large sales, the firm should provide higher commission rate at the intermediate sales in order to achieve the desired level of sales. We could approximate the solid s-shaped compensation function by a piecewise linear function. The commission rate structure in Figure 2 resembles the common structure in Figure 1 .
The results associated with two other utility specifications, the power function and the exponential function, are qualitatively similar. The fairness concern always increases the convexity at small sales and the concavity at large sales. Under the power utility function, compared to BLSS, fairness concern turns an otherwise convex sales compensation function into an s-shaped function. Under the exponential utility function, sufficiently large fairness concern turns an otherwise concave function into an s-shaped function.
Thus far we have theoretically established the optimality of s-shaped compensation schemes.
However, the compensation function s(x) as a solution to Equation (7) may be potentially complex for a firm to communicate to its salespeople. BLSS suggests in practice firms typically use quota-based commission plans to approximate the optimal function s(x). Such an approximation leads to minimal loss of optimality, as demonstrated by RS. Following the same approach, in the next section, we investigate easy-to-implement s-shaped compensation plans like those in Figure 1 . We use numerical analysis to examine the non-optimality associated with our approximation. Since the presence of an upper limit is a distinctive feature of our results in Proposition 1, we will also investigate the optimal size of pay caps and its relationship with a number of market characteristics. 
Approximating S-Shaped Compensation Schemes with Capped Quota Plans: A Numerical Analysis
To implement the optimal s-shaped compensation scheme in a large sales force that consists of multiple groups of salespeople and territories, we consider a capped quota plan commonly used in practice.
5 This sales structure resembles ones often used in a multi-division firm where the sales environment (response 5 The pay cap in a capped quota plan is not the same as the upper limit for the sales compensations in the optimal plan given by Proposition 1. As we demonstrate later in the numerical studies, the optimal pay caps in the capped quota plans are typically smaller than the upper limits for the optimal sales compensation plans.
Commission Rate
Sales ( 
High-sales area:
Firm has incentive to cap the pay to contain salespeople's pay inequity (negative externality).
Intermediate-sales area: Firm gives out higher commission rates to induce efforts lost due to pay cap.
Low-sales area:
Fairness concern adds extra incentive for focal salesperson to work harder to avoid experiencing negative utility from pay inequity.
Sales Compensation s(x)
BLSS-optimal pays S-shaped Compensation Scheme functions and organizational culture) are often similar within each division, but can be quite different across divisions. 6 As in Section 3, we assume salespeople within each group to be identical and use only their peers within the division as the reference group to form fairness judgments. A capped quota plan consists of a salary E, a commission rate R, sales quota q 1i , and cap-inducing sales q 2i for sales agent group i (see Figure 3) . The firm implements the same compensation plan within each group, but allows some differences between groups to account for their different sales environments. Following RS, we assume the base salary E and commission rate R to be identical for all groups, but the sales quota q 1i and cap-inducing sales q 2i are specific to sales division i. The group-specific sales quota and sales cap depend on the group's sales response function and their salespeople's risk preferences and sensitivities to pay inequity. We formulate the capped quota plan for sales group i as follows:
In Equation (11), each salesperson in sales group i receives only a salary E before reaching sales quota q 1i . After reaching the quota, each salesperson earns a sales commission at rate R for the incremental sales above q 1i . The salesperson will not receive any additional sales commissions after reaching the cap-inducing sales q 2i , capping total amount of commission at (q 2i -q 1i )R.
The capped quota plan given by (11) is different from the optimal s-shaped compensation scheme given by Proposition 1 in two ways. First, the capped quota plan is a piece-wise linear approximation of a general s-shaped function. Thus, the capped quota plan does not perfectly fit the curvature of optimal sshaped function. Following RS, we define such loss of optimality as shape-induced non-optimality. Second, the capped quota plan imposes the same salary (E) and commission rate (R) for all groups. This restriction on E and R can substantially reduce the complexity of compensation design in a multi-division sales force, but comes at a cost. Again following RS, we define heterogeneity-induced non-optimality as the loss of optimality arising from the constraints on equal salary and commission rate across groups.
Figure 3: Capped Quota Plans
Our numerical studies have two main objectives. (1) We intend to investigate the performance of capped quota plans. Specifically, in the spirit of RS, we examine how well a capped quota plan approximates the optimal s-shaped compensation scheme on optimality. We also examine whether the source of sub-optimality is due to a lower sales effort (and therefore lower expected sales) or due to overcompensation. (2) We also explore the determinants of pay caps. While determinants of quotas and commission rates have been studied extensively in the literature, pay caps have not been formally examined. To identify the key drivers, we explore a set of environmental variables such as the size of the reference group, salesperson characteristics, and market-territory characteristics.
Numerical Analysis Method
To remain comparable with previous numerical analyses conducted in RS, we start by assuming that sales volume (x i ) follows a gamma distribution with following probability distribution function: The numerical analysis covers a parametrical space defined by different values of parameters (, , N, R 0 , d, , h, k, q) . Following RS, we set profit margin (η) equal to one. Table 1 summarizes the numerical values of the parameters used, grouped into three categories: salesperson characteristics, territory characteristics, and salesperson-territory characteristics. In addition to all the parameters included in RS, our analysis contains two new parameters: fairness concern (β) and number of salespeople in each group (N). Please note that the parameter N captures the size of reference group. We include three levels of fairness concerns;  = 0 (no fairness concern),  = 0.001 (mild concern for fairness), and  = 0.01 (strong concern for fairness). We also include three levels of reference group sizes; N=2, 3, and 5. For the rest of parameters, to provide comparability with previous research, we use the same levels of parameter values as in RS. All together, the parameter values in Table 1 provide a total of 2×2×2×3×2×2×2×2×2=768 combinations. 7 To avoid unnecessary repetition, we refer to RS for more information on interpreting each of these parameters and the selection of their respective values for numerical analysis.
We use numerical optimization techniques to analyze both the optimal compensation scheme given by Equation (8) and the optimal quota plan with pay caps given by Equation (11). In order to obtain the analytical results required to solve the optimal compensation scheme, we extend the optimization analysis 7 The case of  = 0 is same as in RS and is not used in the analysis of pay caps.
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in Appendix 2. Based on these analytical results, we numerically solve the optimal s-shaped compensation scheme for any given set of (, , N, R 0 , d, , h, k, q) , following a two-stage numerical method similar with Basu and Kalyanaram (1990) . We briefly summarize the two-stage numerical procedure below. (3)) and IC condition (Equation (4)) are binding. Due to the complexity of the compensation plan s(x) (Equation (8)), we are unable to obtain a closed form expression for t m . Hence, we compute BM and t m using a dichotomic search algorithm.
Stage 2.
Find optimal A* and B* with the following two-step process.
1. Varying t from 0 to t m incrementally in small steps, for each t, we solve for A* and B* using the same procedures as in Basu and Kalyanaram (1990) and calculate the corresponding profit for the firm.
2. After searching for all possible values of t, we find the optimal t * that yields the highest profit.
The associated A* and B* are the parameters for the optimal compensation plan s(x).
Using a similar method, we numerically solve the optimal quota plan with a pay cap for any given parametrical set of (, , N, R 0 , d, , h, k, q) . The procedure is briefly summarized below.
Stage 1.
With E varying from 0 to EM and R from 0 to RM, for each incremental step, we find optimal sales quota and cap-inducing sales for each pair of E and R for all combinations. Here EM is determined based on the starting salaries under s-shaped compensation plan and RM is set to be one because the commission rate should not exceed one. We then calculate the firm's total profit by adding up the profits under all combinations. For a particular combination i, we solve for q * i1 and q * i2 using the following two-step process.
1. With t i varying from i t to i t , for each t i we solve for q i1 and q i2 using an exhaustive search algorithm with a reasonable incremental searching step and calculate the corresponding profit for the firm. Here i t and i t are set based on the levels of sales effort under the s-shaped plan.
2. After searching for all possible t i 's, we find the optimal t i * that yields the highest profit. The associated q * i1 and q * i2 are the sales quota and cap-inducing sales for the quota plan with a pay cap.
Stage 2. After searching for all possible pairs of E and R, we find the optimal pair E * and R * that yields the highest total profit. This pair of E * and R * , along with all the associated q * i1 and q * i2 's, are the parameters required to define the quota plan with pay cap.
Note that the optimal s-shaped compensation scheme maximizes a firm's expected profit from each set of parameter values. Naturally this will maximize the total expected profits from all 768 sets of parameter values also. However, in searching for the optimal capped quota plans, we maximize the total profits from all 768 sets of parameter values. As we constrain salary and commission rates to be equal, the profits from the optimal capped quota plans will be lower than the profits from optimal tailored s-shaped schemes.
Results
We first examine how well the capped quota plan performs in comparison to the optimal s-shaped compensation scheme when salespeople are concerned with pay equity. Last, we study the determinants for optimal pay caps.
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Non-Optimality of the Capped Quota Plan
Following RS, we measure the performance by the magnitude of non-optimality -the percentage loss of optimality -as defined by
. Here S  refers to the firm's expected profit under the optimal s-shaped compensation scheme and Cap  refers to the expected profit under the capped quota plan. N op includes both shape-induced and heterogeneity-induced non-optimality defined by RS. Since N and  are two new parameters unique to our model of pay equity, in Table 2 we show the level of nonoptimality of the capped quota plan for each combination of N and . For each set of N and , there are 128 combinations of parameter values. In each cell of Table 2 , we present the average, largest, and smallest non-optimality values computed over these 128 scenarios. Similar to findings in RS, Table 2 shows the average non-optimality, combining shape-induced and heterogeneity-induced non-optimality, to be small, and no more than 2% in all six scenarios. This suggests that the capped quota plans perform quite well in approximating the optimal s-shaped compensation scheme tailored to each individual salesperson.
Sources of Non-Optimality
To further understand sources of non-optimality associated with the capped quota plans, we explore the effect on intermediate outcomes such as sales volume (i.e., the revenue for the firm) and the salespeople's salaries (cost of compensation). Table 3 shows the changes in expected sales volume as well as changes in salespeople's expected salaries under the capped quota plan vs. the optimal s-shaped compensation plan.
If the change in sales volume is positive, it suggests that on average the expected sales volume under the capped quota plan is lower than that under the optimal s-shaped compensation plan. Similarly, a positive change in salary suggests that a salesperson earns a lower salary under the capped quota plan than under the optimal s-shaped compensation plan.
Based on Table 3 , we find that when fairness concern is weak (i.e., =0.001) or when the reference group is small (i.e., =0.01 and N=2), on average expected sales volumes are lower under the capped quota plan than under the s-shaped plan. In these cases, the average expected salary is also lower under the capped quota plan. This suggests that when the fairness concern is weak or when the reference group is small, the non-optimality in the firm's expected profits can arise from lower sales volume. The reduction in sales volume is mostly due to the pay cap, as empirically demonstrated in Misra and Nair (2010) . That is, when fairness concern is weak or when the reference group is small, the shape-induced non-optimality from pay caps dominates and leads to reduced sales volume.
Interestingly, when the fairness concerns are strong and reference group size is large, i.e., =0.01 and N=3 or N=5, on average both the expected sales volumes and expected salaries under capped quota plans are higher than those under s-shaped compensation plans! Thus, when salespeople have strong fairness concerns and the size of the reference group is large, the non-optimality may result from higher salaries to salespeople rather than changes in sales volumes. Since the salary is restricted to be same for all salespeople, the firm reduces incentives and increases salary to manage the expected pay inequity. That is, when fairness concerns are strong and reference group size is large, the heterogeneity-induced non-optimality dominates and leads to higher expected salaries. 1.87%, 7.32%, 0.29% 1.90%, 6.90%, 0.44% 1.79%, 6.31%, 0.34%
1.87%, 5.97%, 0.33% 1.37%, 6.82%, 0.00% 0.51%, 7.24%, 0.00% 
Determinants of Optimal Pay Caps
In order to study how optimal pay caps are affected by salesperson-specific, territory-specific, and salesperson and territory-specific parameters listed in Table 1 , we conduct a regression analysis on 768 simulated results, using the optimal pay cap as the dependent variable and the following six parameters as independent variables: size of reference group N, salespeople's fairness concerns , their risk aversion , base sales h, selling effectiveness k, and certainty in sales q. The detailed regression results are reported in Appendix 3 and the qualitative results summarized in Table 4 . 
Effect of Size of Reference Group (N) on Pay Caps. Our results suggest that the optimal pay cap will be lower when the reference group becomes larger. When fair-minded salespeople compare their pay with the reference pay, i.e., the highest pay in the reference group, the optimal sales cap should decrease with the size of reference group. With a larger reference group, a salesperson is less likely to become the top salesperson and hence is more likely to experience disutility from the comparison with the top achiever.
Moreover, a higher pay for the top salesperson would lead to a greater amount of aggregate disutility when more salespeople suffer from the experience of pay inequity. Since the disutility of pay inequity has a negative impact on the firm's profit, the firm should set a lower pay cap in order to contain the expected pay inequity.
Effect of Fairness Concerns () on Pay Caps.
Regression results show that the optimal pay cap will be lower when salespeople are more concerned with pay inequity. When salespeople are more fair-minded, the firm should set a lower pay cap to restraint the sales differences among salespeople to reduce the expected disutility from pay differences. With a lower pay cap, salespeople who are otherwise equal, will not be rewarded for very lucky realizations of demand.
Effect of Risk Aversion () on Pay Caps. Our regression results suggest that the optimal pay cap should be lower when salespeople are more risk averse. A smaller  implies lower marginal value for extra pay to the salespeople. As a result, extra sales commissions will be less effective in motivating the salespeople.
Setting a lower pay cap, while reducing the expected pay inequity, will not significantly depress the selling effort from salespeople. Consequently the optimal pay cap is lower.
Effects of Base Sales (h), Selling Effectiveness (k), and Certainty in Sales (q) on Pay Caps.
The regression results show that, when the base sales is larger (larger h), the pay cap should be higher. When sales effort is more effective in generating sales (larger k), the pay cap should be greater. Since selling efforts are very effective, a firm wants to set a high pay cap in order not to depress the productive selling efforts. When the uncertainty in sales is high (smaller q), the firm should set a higher pay cap. A larger 27 sales uncertainty makes it more difficult to induce selling effort. As a result, a higher pay cap is required to avoid dampening salespeople's motivations.
Conclusion and Future Research
This paper demonstrates that salespeople's concerns for pay inequity can affect the design of optimal compensation schemes. Specifically, concerns for pay inequity can lead to optimal compensation schemes to be s-shaped, and also suggests the use of pay caps. In addition to providing a theoretical basis for sshaped compensation schemes and pay caps, this paper suggests the possibility of implementing s-shaped compensation schemes through a simple capped quota plan. Numerical analyses illustrate near optimal performance of capped quota plans within the parametric scenarios studied. Results from our numerical studies further suggest that firms should impose lower pay caps when agents are more fair-minded, more risk averse, and/or are a part of a larger reference group. Pay caps should be higher when the territories have larger base demand, are more responsive to selling efforts, and/or face more stochastic demand.
Overall, when imposing a pay cap, a firm needs to balance the benefit from reduced pay inequity with the potential cost due to diminished selling efforts.
We visualize several possible directions for future research. First, future research may consider alternative ways to formulate reference points to model inequity. This paper assumes that a salesperson compares his pay with the highest pay among equivalent peers. While there is some empirical support for our formulation, there are alternative ways to formulate reference points; including the average pay within the reference group, the target set by the manager, or status quo. Second, future research may study salespeople's reactions to pay inequity in other ways. For example, in addition to experiencing disutility as modeled in this paper, salespeople may shirk to intentionally "punish" the principal (Akerlof and Yellen 1988,1990; Rabin 1993) . Third, future research may investigate the effectiveness of other types of compensation schemes in dealing with fair-minded agents such as bonus contracts or trust contracts with upfront wage payments studied in Fehr, Alexander and Schmidt (2007) .
Appendix 1
In this appendix we prove Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3. Proposition 1 can be directly inferred from these three lemma's. In the proof, following BLSS (1985) , we analyze three alternative utility specifications corresponding to different rate of change of risk tolerance:
Case 1: Power function ( with 0<<1) with rate of change of risk tolerance =1/(1-δ) >1. In this case,
Case 2: Log function (log(s)) with rate of change of risk tolerance =1. In this case,
Case 3: Exponential function with constant risk aversion (a -) with rate of change of risk tolerance=0.
In this case, 
For any B  0, we would have , which contradicts with assumption s(x)>0. 
Again, for any B  0, we would have , which contradicts with assumption s(x)>0.
Case 3: Exponential utility function
Since the optimal compensation function has the property that 
Assumption s(x)>0 and Equation (A5) together imply that
Note that for =0, we have 
The c.d.f. of the largest order statistic max x j , j=1..N and ji, denoted as x (N-1) , is given by 39 Appendix 3 Table A1 shows regression results for the determinants of pay caps. We summarize the qualitative results in Table 4 . 
